This book has grown out of eight years of close collaboration among its authors. From the very beginning we decided that its content should come out as the result of a truly common effort. That is, we did not "distribute" parts of the text planned to each one of us. On the contrary, we made a point that each single paragraph be the product of a common reflection. Genuine team-work is not as usual in philosophy as it is in other (...) academic disciplines. We think, however, that this is more due to the idiosyncrasy of philosophers than to the nature of their subject. Close collaboration with positive results is as rewarding as anything can be, but it may also prove to be quite difficult to implement. In our case, part of the difficulties came from purely geographic separation. This caused unsuspected delays in coordinating the work. But more than this, as time passed, the accumulation of particular results and ideas outran our ability to fit them into an organic unity. Different styles of exposition, different ways of formalization, different levels of complexity were simultaneously present in a voluminous manuscript that had become completely unmanageable. In particular, a portion of the text had been conceived in the language of category theory and employed ideas of a rather abstract nature, while another part was expounded in the more conventional set-theoretic style, stressing intui tivity and concreteness. (shrink)

Fundamentos de filosofía de la ciencia es una obra de carácter general destinada principalmente a servir de guía a alumnos y profesores en la ensañanza universitaria de esta disciplina, en especial para los estudios de Filosofía, pero también para los de Humanidades y Ciencias Humanas y Naturales. La obra está estructurada en diferentes niveles para facilitar su utilización como libro de texto, tanto en cursos introductorios generales como en seminarios específicos. Aunque el público universitario es su principal destinatario, se ha (...) concebido para que cualquier lector interesado en la disciplina y con determinados conocimientos previos pueda acceder, con provecho, a las diversas partes de la misma. Ha diferencia de la mayoría de introducciones a la Filosofía de la Ciencia, la orientación de esta obra no es histórica sino temática, cubriendo los diferentes ámbitos conceptuales de la disciplina. Su contenido, dado que su finalidad es presentar los fundamentos de la materia, se centra en los grandes temas clásicos de la disciplina. El núcleo temático lo conforma la triada "conceptos-leyes-teorías" en torno a cuyos componentes se presentan los restantes temas: contrastación de hipótesis, medición, explicación, relaciones interteóricas, el problema de la inducción y el cambio teórico. En tanto que introducción general de la disciplina, en esta obra no se pretende ninguna tesis metacientífica o metafilosófica sustantiva, sino exponer de forma clara los principales problemas filosóficos que plantea la actividad científica y discutir las diferentes aproximaciones a los mismos.. (shrink)

Contents: Foreword. Wolfgang BALZER and C. ULISES MOULINES: Introduction. José A. DÍEZ CALZADA: Structuralist Analysis of Theories of Fundamental Measurement. Adolfo GARCÍA DE LA SIENRA and Pedro REYES: The Theory of Finite Games in Extensive Form. Hans Joachim BURSCHEID und Horst STRUVE: The Theory of Stochastic Fairness - its Historical Development, Formulation and Justification. Wolfgang BALZER and Richard MATTESSICH: Formalizing the Basis of Accounting. Werner DIEDERICH: A Reconstruction of Marxian Economics. Bert HAMMINGA and Wolfgang BALZER: The Basic Structure of Neoclassical (...) General Equilibrium Theory. Klaus MANHART: Balance Theories: Two Reconstructions and the Problem of Intended Applications. Rainer WESTERMANN: Festinger's Theory of Cognitive Dissonance: A Structuralist Theory-Net. Rainer REISENZEIN: Wundt's Three-Dimensional Theory of Emotion. Pablo LORENZANO: Classical Genetics and the Theory-Net of Genetics. Hinne HETTEMA and Theo A.F. KUIPERS: The Formalisation of the Periodic Table. C. ULISES MOULINES: The Basic Core of Simple Equilibrium Thermodynamics. Thomas BARTELBORTH: An Axiomatization of Classical Electrodynamics. Author's Index. Subject Index. (shrink)

In this paper I propose clearly to distinguish four fundamental types of intertheoretical relations that may be used to represent different types of theoretical change in empirical science. These four types can be represented formally through a refined version of the set-theoretical apparatus of structuralism. They may be described as: crystallization, theory-evolution, embedding, and replacement with partial incommensurability. They will be first explicated in intuitive, informal terms, and some historical examples will be suggested for each type. In the second part (...) of the paper, the four types are characterized in structuralistic terms; the notions of a partial substructure and of a diachronic theory-net will play a central role. (shrink)

In a scientific context, ontological commitments should be considered as supervenient over accepted scientific theories. This implies that the primarily ontological notions of reduction and emergence of entities of different kinds should be reformulated in terms of relations between existing empirical theories. For this, in turn, it is most convenient to employ a model-theoretic view of scientific theories: the identity criterion of a scientific theory is essentially given by a class of models. Accordingly, reduction and emergence are to be seen (...) as particular kinds of relations between (some) models of different theories that subsume the same (or a similar) “experiential field”. The set-theoretical notion of an echelon-set proves to be crucial for this purpose: The domains in the models of the reduced theory are echelon-sets over the domains of the reducing theory. Finally, it is argued that emergence may plausibly be interpreted as akin to but weaker than reduction. (shrink)

En este trabajo sc presenta un marco general en el que desarrollar una “ontoepistemo-semántica” para las teodas científicas y sus terminos característicos. En primer lugar, se defiende la esencialidad de los aspectos ontologicos y epistemológicos para la semantica y se hacen explícitos los principios generales que constituyen dicho marco. A continuación, se aplican estos principios al análisis ontoepistemosemántico de cada uno de los tres tipos principales de términos científicos: términos relacionales y funcionales con contenido empírico, términos matemáticos puros y términos (...) para los dominios ontológicos básicos.In this paper I offer a general framework for all “ontoepistenlosemantics” of scientific theories and scientific terms. First, I argue for the essential dependence of semantics on ontological and epistemological aspects and I make explicit the general principIes that make up this frame. Then, I apply these principles to the ontoepistemosmantical analysis of the three main kinds of scientific terms: relational and functional term with empirical content, purely mathematical terms and terms for basic ontological domains. (shrink)

Die Standard-Interpretation von Carnaps Logischer Außau der Welt als unmittelbarer Nachfolger des britischen Empirismus wird anhand einer detaillierten Untersuchung des philosophischen und naturwissenschaftlichen Zusammenhangs, auf den Carnap selbst explizit oder implizit verweist, kritisiert. Es stellt sich heraus, daß Carnaps Unterfangen vor allem auf den Ansätzen einer "psychophysiologischen Erkenntnistheorie" fußt — einer Richtung, die vor allem im deutschsprachigen Bereich am Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts einflußreich war, und die noch ungenügend erforscht worden ist.

En este trabajo sc presenta un marco general en el que desarrollar una “ontoepistemo-semántica” para las teodas científicas y sus terminos característicos. En primer lugar, se defiende la esencialidad de los aspectos ontologicos y epistemológicos para la semantica y se hacen explícitos los principios generales que constituyen dicho marco. A continuación, se aplican estos principios al análisis ontoepistemosemántico de cada uno de los tres tipos principales de términos científicos: términos relacionales y funcionales con contenido empírico, términos matemáticos puros y términos (...) para los dominios ontológicos básicos. In this paper I offer a general framework for all “ontoepistemosemantics” of scientific theories and scientific terms. First, I argue for the essential dependence of semantics on ontological and epistemological aspects and I make explicit the general principIes that make up this frame. Then, I apply these principles to the ontoepistemosmantical analysis of the three main kinds of scientific terms: relational and functional term with empirical content, purely mathematical terms and terms for basic ontological domains. (shrink)

Die Standard-Interpretation von Carnaps Logischer Außau der Welt als unmittelbarer Nachfolger des britischen Empirismus wird anhand einer detaillierten Untersuchung des philosophischen und naturwissenschaftlichen Zusammenhangs, auf den Carnap selbst explizit oder implizit verweist, kritisiert. Es stellt sich heraus, daß Carnaps Unterfangen vor allem auf den Ansätzen einer "psychophysiologischen Erkenntnistheorie" fußt — einer Richtung, die vor allem im deutschsprachigen Bereich am Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts einflußreich war, und die noch ungenügend erforscht worden ist.

La finalidad de este trabajo es revisar una de las nociones centrales de la metateoría estructuralista, la noción de principio-guía, mostrar su fecundidad para abordar algunas cuestiones centrales tanto de filosofía general como de filosofía especial de la ciencia, así como de historia de la filosofía de la ciencia, y, por último, revisar y valorar algunas propuestas de elucidación de la misma. La conclusión es que se trata de una noción tan fructífera como difícil de analizar.

In two occasions a Bibliography of Structuralism has been published in Erkenntnis (1989, 1994). Since then a lot of water has flowed under the bridge and the structuralist program has shown a continuous development. The aim of the present bibliography is to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the publication of An Architectonic for Science –structuralism’s main reference work– and of its recent translation into Spanish by updating the previous bibliographies with titles which have appeared since 1994 as well as before (...) that year but which are not included in them. As in the former deliveries, this bibliography only covers books and articles that are concerned directly with the structuralist approach in the philosophy of science. We would like to thank the many colleagues who have helped us in collecting all the information. Notwithstanding we apologize in advance for the possible entries that we missed to include in this third Bibliography of Structuralism. (shrink)

Ontology should be conceived as supervenient on scientific theories. They tell us what categories of things there really are. Thus, we would have a unique system of ontology if we would attain the unity of science through a reductionist program. For this, it should be clear how a relation of intertheoretical reduction (with ontological implications) is to be conceived. A formal proposal is laid out in this paper. This allows us also to define the notion of a fundamental theory. Now, (...) it appears that, considering the state of really existing science, the idea of reductionism as based on this explication is highly implausible. However, even if this is the case, the question whether it is possible to build up a unique ontological system remains open. Its resolution depends on the notion of compatibility between fundamental theories, and its application to existing theories and their empirical bases. (shrink)

Theoria, Volume 88, Issue 4, Page 782-798, August 2022.

Na filosofia da ciência duas questões tornam-se centrais na discussão da natureza da ciência empírica: 1) o que é uma teoria (científica)? Ou seja, como é construída, como funciona? E, 2) como é que uma teoria se relaciona com sua base experiencial correspondente? Para lidar com estas duas questões, a moderna filosofia da ciência concebeu vários “modelos” (metateóricos) sobre a natureza e o funcionamento das teorias científicas. Alguns aspectos desses modelos são amplamente aceitos pela comunidade de filósofos da ciência, mas (...) outros ainda estão sendo discutidos de forma bastante controversa. Neste artigo, vamos considerar ambos tipos de aspectos. Particularmente, analisaremos como o significado dos conceitos científicos é determinado; a construção axiomática de uma teoria científica; a ideia de construção de modelos como uma ponte entre a teoria e a experiência; a tese semântica holística da ciência; a questão sobre a verdade das teorias científicas e, finalmente, a estrutura hierárquica das teorias. (shrink)